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Abstract
In this paper we focus on the role of caseworkers in the assignment and take-up of
welfare-to-work programs. We conduct a field experiment that generates exogenous
variation in the assignment to different policy regimes to caseworkers. The experi-
ment allows us to provide evidence on the effectiveness of welfare-to-work programs
and to study how caseworkers exploit their discretion in assigning these programs
to welfare recipients. We find substantial heterogeneity in how caseworkers assign
welfare-to-work programs. Participation in the experiment and learning about the
effectiveness of the different programs does not induce caseworkers to focus more on
the effective programs. This implies that obtaining knowledge about welfare-to-work
programs is not enough to improve policy, also effort on implementation is required.
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1 Introduction
Randomized control trials (RCTs) are increasingly used to evaluate the effectiveness of ac-
tive labor market programs. In their 2010 meta analysis on active labor market programs,
Card et al. (2010) report that 10 percent of the studies use an RCT explicitly designed
to empirically evaluate a program. In the 2018 update this increased to 19 percent (Card
et al., 2018). RCTs solve the problem of selective participation in active labor market
programs and, therefore, are considered to provide a credible empirical evaluation (e.g.
Heckman et al., 1999). However, using RCTs some problems remain unsolved (Rothstein
and Wachter, 2017). For example, the estimated treatment effect is only policy relevant if
program participation can easily be varied, which requires that caseworkers have limited
discretionary power when deciding about participation in active labor market programs.
In this paper, we focus on the role of the caseworker in the assignment and take-up of
active labor market programs. RCTs assign all unemployed workers in the treatment group
to participate in the program, but usually ignore the take-up decision. The strict program
assignment rule of an RCT does not concur with the large degree of discretion which
caseworkers have in many countries (e.g. Behncke et al., 2009; Bell and Orr, 2002; Lechner
and Smith, 2007; Schmieder and Trenkle, 2016; Vikstro¨m, 2017).1 The average treatment
effect estimated using the RCT may then not be the most policy relevant treatment effect.
While there is quite a lot of recent evidence on the effectiveness of various active labor
market programs, for example documented in Card et al. (2018), much less is known about
the motivations and goals of caseworkers (Schmieder and Trenkle, 2016).
This paper contributes to the literature by answering three questions. First, we inves-
tigate whether a caseworker assigns unemployed workers to active labor market programs
which are most effective for them. We study a setting where caseworkers have a limited
caseload and meetings with benefits recipients occur frequently. Caseworkers have an ex-
cellent opportunity to gain detailed information about the client’s ability and needs, which
allows them to effectively match clients to services (Lechner and Smith, 2007). Second, we
1Vikstro¨m (2017) refers to a PhD thesis by Eriksson (1997), which shows that caseworker heterogeneity
is more important than heterogeneity among unemployed workers when assigning active labor market
programs.
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explore if caseworkers prefer certain programs, which they offer to most of their benefits
recipients. Related to this we investigate if caseworkers which express such specialization
in a particular program obtain better results when providing this program to a benefits
recipient. Third, we study learning of caseworkers by investigating if caseworkers ad-
just their beliefs and actions after having been exposed to a different (and possibly more
effective) way of working.
We conduct a field experiment covering all new entrants into welfare benefits (with
a potential to work) in Amsterdam in the period April 2012 to March 2013.2 The field
experiment generates exogenous variation in the assignment to three different welfare-to-
work programs: direct job matching, job-search training and counseling. We evaluate
these programs against two alternatives, one where the caseworker has full discretion
in choosing the program which she finds most appropriate and one where the benefits
recipient does not participate in any program. This setup allows us to evaluate each of
the programs against the alternative of no program and to study what the added value of
caseworkers is in selecting an effective program. In addition, the program choices when
the caseworker has full discretion identify specialization of the caseworker. We address
this specialization and the beliefs about the effectiveness of the different programs in a
survey among caseworkers which provides insights in learning by caseworkers after having
gained experience with other programs.
Our study relates to a substantial literature evaluating active labor market programs
summarized in Card et al. (2018). Most RCTs focus on a program additional to the stan-
dard support provided to benefits recipients (e.g. Graversen and Van Ours, 2008; Van den
Berg and Van der Klaauw, 2006). A unique feature of our field experiment is that we
introduce a treatment where no support is given, which allows to evaluate the existing
programs rather than only new programs. Our study also relates to the literature on
the optimal assignment of unemployed workers to active labor market programs. Lechner
and Smith (2007) compare caseworker discretion, a statistical treatment rule based on
2This field experiment was implemented simultaneously with the experiment evaluating job search pe-
riods prior to entry in welfare benefits which is described in Bolhaar et al. (2018). The random assignment
in both field experiments is orthogonal, which allows to evaluate them separately.
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observable participant characteristics and random assignment to services and find that
caseworkers obtain roughly the same post-program employment rate as the random allo-
cation, while statistical treatment rules outperform both. Compared to our study, they
measure program effectiveness by only controlling for observed participant characteristics
rather than using exogenous variation from a field experiment. Behncke et al. (2009) focus
on targeting active labor market programs using a large field experiment in Switzerland.
They find that caseworkers ignore the information of the statistical system which is pro-
vided to them and thus do not change behavior. Also, Schmieder and Trenkle (2016) find
that caseworkers do not optimize their behavior when the length of the entitlement period
to unemployment insurance benefits changes.
For the empirical analysis we combine data from different sources to construct a very
detailed administrative dataset describing the participants in our field experiment. We
observe individual labor market histories in the years prior to collecting welfare benefits, we
have measures of guidance received at the welfare agency such as meetings with caseworkers
and participation in welfare-to-work programs, and after exit from the welfare benefits we
observe employment status and earnings at the daily level. Our empirical results do not
show evidence in favor of efficient targeting of welfare-to-work programs. Some caseworkers
specialize into very frequent use of only a single welfare-to-work program, but this does not
translate into them being more effective in using this program. We also do not find evidence
for caseworker learning. Most striking is that some caseworkers continue specializing in
job-search training even after having been informed that it only has adverse effects on
the labor market outcomes of benefits recipients. The policy implication is that even if
a randomized controlled trial provides credible evidence on the effectiveness of certain
treatments, the roll-out of such policies is not obvious.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides details
about the welfare system in the Netherlands, the specific setting of the experiment and
describes the role of caseworkers. In section 3 we explain the experimental design of the
field experiment. Section 4 describes the data, provides evidence on the randomization
and compliance rates and discusses the empirical strategy and identification. In section 5
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we present the main results, and section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional background and the role of casework-
ers
2.1 Welfare benefits in the Netherlands
Welfare provides benefits to households that do not have enough income. The benefits
level depends on the composition of the household.3 Monthly benefits range from 668
euro for a single without children, to 1336 euro for a couple with children. In the same
period the net minimum wage was about 1200 euros per month. Individuals with a (part-
time) job earning less than the welfare benefits level, can receive partial welfare benefits,
which complement their income from work to the welfare benefits level. In that case, the
marginal tax rate for (additional) earnings is 100 percent. There is no limit to the period
that households can be welfare benefits recipient. Welfare recipients have the obligation to
accept any type of employment, also if it does not fit their education or work experience.
The rules on eligibility for welfare and the level of the benefits are determined at
the national level, but municipalities decide about welfare-to-work programs and other
activation policies for welfare recipients. Individuals have to apply for welfare benefits in
the municipality where they live. Our experiment was set up in Amsterdam, which had
790,110 inhabitants on January 1, 2012. Within the population between 20 and 65 years
old in Amsterdam, 6.4 percent receive welfare benefits, compared to 3.1 percent for the
whole of the Netherlands.
3Table A1 in the Appendix gives an overview of the different benefits levels by household composition
in the year 2012 (start of our observation period).
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2.2 Caseworkers
Welfare applicants in Amsterdam are randomly matched to a caseworker (within the wel-
fare office), which allows the benefits agency to benchmark caseworkers against each other.4
Applicants are supposed to meet their caseworker twice a month. These meetings with the
caseworker are not necessarily face-to-face meetings but can also be phone calls or email
contacts. The caseworker supports the welfare recipient in her job search, can offer partic-
ipation in welfare-to-work programs, monitors job search effort and sanctions individuals
that do not comply with the job search requirements.5 The welfare-to-work programs are
discussed in more detail in the next section.
During the first meeting the caseworker determines the labor market prospects of the
welfare applicant using a computerized program that profiles based on characteristics
such as work history, age, education, language and computer skills, family situation and
physical or psychological problems. This results in a classification into four classes. This
classification determines which type of guidance a welfare benefits recipient receives and
what the obligations of the welfare recipient are. We focus on class IV, which contains
welfare recipients who do not have work limitations and are considered to be able to find
a job within six months. Welfare recipients in this class have to actively search for work
(typically they are required to make one or two job applications each week). About 40
percent of all welfare applicants in Amsterdam are assigned to class IV.6 Welfare offices
have teams of caseworkers that support only welfare recipients in class IV in their job
search. If the welfare recipient does not find work within six months, she should be
transferred to class III and another team of caseworkers. In practice, the period in class
IV is often extended with some months.
4Note that we can not use the average treatment assignment rate of a caseworker as an instrumental
variable to estimate the effect of the treatment, as Maestas et al. (2013) and Dahl et al. (2014) do.
Caseworkers usually interact more with their clients than judges and may also provide guidance unrelated
to the decided treatment. If this type of guidance is related to how frequent caseworkers choose certain
active labor market programs, the validity of an instrumental variable approach is violated.
5A sanction generally reduces benefits with 30 percent for one month.
6The three other classes have a larger distance to the labor market. Class III individuals should be
able to work, but lack some (social) skills and require guidance to find work and stay employed. These
individuals often start working in a subsidized job. Individuals in class I and II have social problems
and/or physical limitations that make them unfit for work.
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Table 1: Caseworker characteristics
Mean
Female 60%
Age 41.9
Bachelor/master degree 96%
Years worked at welfare agency 10.6
Being caseworker is first job 23%
Ever received benefits 29%
N 50
Note: The information in this table is based on a survey among the caseworkers that participated in the
experiment. The response rate to the survey is 80.6 percent.
Table 1 provides characteristics of the caseworkers for the welfare recipients in class IV.
These caseworkers are on average 42 years old, almost all hold a bachelor and/or master
degree and 60 percent are female. Average tenure at the welfare agency is long (almost
11 years), although for only 23 percent of the caseworkers it is their first job. Finally, 29
percent of the caseworkers have ever received either welfare or unemployment insurance
benefits.
2.3 Welfare-to-work programs and caseworker discretion
A caseworker assigned to class IV can use three programs to support welfare recipients
in their job search. First, they can send the individual to a job-search activation course.
This is an intensive eight-week program with daily sessions. During the first two weeks
welfare recipients receive job-application training and guidance on how to find vacancies.
During the subsequent six weeks participants spend a few hours per day in a computer
room, where they make job applications (under the guidance of a trainer). Second, the
caseworker can match the individual directly to a vacancy, which is taken from a pool of
vacancies gathered by a separate unit in the welfare office. The match is often accompanied
by a trial period or a wage subsidy for the employer.7 Third, the caseworker can apply
7A trial period is period of one to three months in which a welfare benefits recipient works for an
employer but is still receiving welfare benefits instead of a wage. Trial periods are aimed at employers
that have hesitations about the capability of welfare benefits recipients and are meant as a possibility for
welfare benefits recipients to prove they are suitable for the job.
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Figure 1: Treatment heterogeneity of caseworkers
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Note: data from post-experiment survey among caseworkers.
caseworker counseling. This includes regular meetings (typically every other week) in
which the caseworker helps the individual with the job-search process, setting up the
C.V., etc. Before our experiment, the caseworker had full discretion in the assignment of
programs to welfare recipients with the restriction that direct matching to vacancies can
only be done in case of a suitable vacancy and the eighth-week training course has entry
requirements on language and computer skills.
The welfare-to-work programs offered by the welfare administration of Amsterdam are
very similar to programs used in many other municipalities, and also, in other countries.
Data from Eurostat shows that most European countries spend substantial amounts on
what they call client services and employment incentives. The job-search activation course
and caseworker counseling fall in the category of client services. According to Eurostat
spendings on client services are highest in Denmark, France, UK, Germany and Sweden.
Direct matching contains most elements considered in employment incentives such as tem-
porary financial incentives to employers. Card et al. (2010) show that in Nordic countries,
but also in Anglo countries a very substantial share of the evaluation studies concern sub-
sidized private sector employment, such as direct matching. Often the programs that are
evaluated in this literature have strong similarities with the programs considered in this
paper.
In a post-experiment survey, we asked the caseworkers to indicate how much they target
programs to welfare recipients. On a zero to one hundred scale caseworkers answer how
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much they agree with two statements (see Figure 1 for a summary of the answers). The
first question concerned heterogeneity among welfare recipients. Almost all caseworkers
agree that heterogeneity in individual characteristics is important when assisting welfare
recipients. The second question concerned the choice for welfare-to-work programs. The
caseworkers indicate that they do not apply a uniform policy to support welfare recipients
in their job search.
To investigate further how caseworkers target welfare-to-work programs to welfare
recipients, we asked the caseworkers how they would support a number of hypothetical
welfare recipients.8 For example, client number one is ‘a married man of 50 years old with
limited command of Dutch and only a primary school degree’. Figure 2 shows how many
caseworkers would use each of the welfare-to-work programs to support each of the seven
individuals. Three things are important to note. First, the program which is chosen most
often varies between the seven cases. Second, caseworkers almost always prefer to provide
a welfare-to-work program over having a passive role and giving the welfare recipient time
to search for work herself. And third, in all cases a substantial number of caseworkers
deviates from the most often chosen welfare-to-work program. The results confirm that
heterogeneity among welfare applicants is taken into account when offering welfare-to-
work programs and show that caseworkers have different opinions about the most suitable
welfare-to-work program and a lot of discretion in providing these programs.
3 The experiment
3.1 Experimental design
The field experiment includes five policy regimes.9 For each of the three welfare-to-work
program, there is a policy regime in which caseworkers are supposed to assign as many
welfare benefits recipients as possible to the specific welfare-to-work program. In the
8Table A2 in the Appendix provides the details of the hypothetical welfare recipients which also the
caseworkers received. These welfare recipients closely resemble actual applicants for welfare benefits at
the time of our experiment.
9The original design of the experiment, including a power analysis, can be found at http://personal.
vu.nl/b.vander.klaauw/ResearchProposalDWI2012.pdf.
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Figure 2: Program applied to fictional clients
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Note: Data from post-experiment survey among caseworkers.
fourth policy regime, benefits recipients do not receive any guidance from the caseworker
and are not supposed to participate in any welfare-to-work program. This is the control
group, which allows to evaluate the effectiveness of the three welfare-to-work programs. In
the fifth policy regime the caseworker has the usual (full) discretion in assigning benefits
recipients to the welfare-to-work programs (or to do not provide guidance). This policy
regime allows us to test if caseworkers can choose the most effective approach for benefits
recipients.
During the experiment, caseworker are assigned to one of the five policy regimes. They
are asked to treat all new clients they receive according to the rules of this policy regime
for at least six months. If following the policy regime is inappropriate or not suitable for
the client, caseworkers can ‘opt out’, and use another program to guide a client back to
work. We prefer to randomize policy regimes rather than participation in a particular
welfare-to-work program. In reality caseworkers always have some discretion or they will
not be able to convince some benefits recipients to participate. Therefore, policy makers
of the welfare agency do not use strict protocols which impose full compliance, but rather
10
formulate policy regimes where some discretion is given to caseworkers.
Every three months the policy regime of the caseworker for new welfare benefits recip-
ients changes. This implies that caseworkers support benefits recipients in different policy
regimes at the same time, as they have to treat an individual according to the same policy
regime for at least six months.10 Welfare recipients apply at five different locations in
Amsterdam, and each location has their own team of caseworkers. We made sure that
in every three-month period each of the five policy regimes is allocated to at least one
member of each team. At the start of a new three-month period, each caseworker was
instructed by us about his or her new policy regime.
The five policy regimes are communicated to the caseworkers as follows:
Counseling Provide counseling to the welfare recipients. Do not act as an intermediary
between vacancies and the welfare recipient and do not offer participation in the
job-search activation program.
Direct matching Try to match the welfare recipient directly to a vacancy. You can offer
a trial period or wage subsidy to an employer if that helps to establish a match.
If there are no appropriate vacancies, provide counseling in the meantime. Do not
offer participation in the job-search activation program.
Job-search activation Offer participation in the job-search activation program to the
welfare recipient. Provide counseling if the welfare recipient lacks the (computer or
language) skills to participate, is on the waiting list or has completed the program.
Do not act as an intermediary between vacancies and the welfare recipient.
Nothing Do not use any welfare-to-work program. Do not initiate contact with the
welfare recipient but be available for questions of the welfare recipient.
Full discretion Choose the program(s) that you think are most appropriate. So follow
your usual approach of supporting the welfare recipient.
10This feature makes the design complicated for the caseworker. To remind them of their current policy
regime, we handed out forms with the policy regime preprinted. Caseworkers were asked to fill in these
forms at the intake meeting. Most caseworkers also note the policy regime in the digital file of each
individual, so that they remember which policy regime the individual is in.
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The policy regimes are based on the programs that the welfare agency offered before
our experiment. The caseworkers were thus experienced in the use of each program.
Comparing the policy regime for each of the three programs with the policy regime nothing
provides insight in the effectiveness of the three welfare-to-work programs. If we compare
the policy regime with full discretion for the caseworker with nothing, we can assess the
added value of the combination of all services provided by the welfare agency. And to
obtain insight in how well caseworkers allocate programs to benefits recipients, we can
compare the policy regime of full discretion to the three policy regimes for each of the
welfare-to-work programs.
The five policy regimes are randomly allocated to caseworkers and apply to all new
welfare benefits recipients in a period of three months. New welfare recipients are within
a local office randomly assigned to caseworkers.11 The number of caseworkers assigned
to the policy regimes is such that overall the number of participants in the job-search
activation program and in direct matching remains similar as before the experiment. The
policy regimes only apply to new welfare recipients, and not to the existing caseload.
Furthermore, caseworkers have welfare recipients who are treated under different policy
regimes at the same time. Roughly the amount of time that caseworkers have available
for each individual in their caseload will not vary much.12
Our setup had several advantages. Full randomization in the context of benefits pro-
grams is often difficult to enforce and raises ethical concerns. This is especially the case
when evaluating existing policies (in contrast to the evaluation of additional policies or
resources) as we achieve when introducing the policy regime nothing. The possibility to
opt out in each policy regime gives caseworkers some discretion to prevent harmful effects
of the experiment. This limited discretion also increased the support among caseworkers
to commit to the experiment. The risk is of course that compliance to the policy regimes
is low. We monitored this throughout the experiment by checking data on participation
11At each local office, new welfare recipients are assigned to the caseworker with the lowest caseload.
Such random assignment allows the welfare agency to evaluate caseworkers based on their (unconditional)
realized outflow.
12At the start of the experiment the managers promised to adjust targets to caseworkers for the assign-
ment of policy regimes to them.
12
in programs. A second risk of our setup is that caseworkers exchange the welfare recip-
ients they support. We can monitor this by checking if welfare recipients meet another
caseworker after the intake meeting and by checking the forms filled in at the intake meet-
ing. Furthermore, in the next section we show balancing of the welfare recipients in the
different policy regimes.
3.2 Implementation
The experiment was conducted in Amsterdam from April 2012 until September 2013. The
sample consists of all new welfare recipients older than 27 years that started collecting
benefits between April 2012 and March 2013 and are classified in class IV (able to find a
job within six months). The welfare agency in Amsterdam is organized in five local offices
which each serve different neighborhoods of the city. Benefits recipients are not informed
about their participation in an experiment, but the setup of the experiment was discussed
with the formal council of welfare recipients.
Before the start of the experiment we organized meetings at all the local offices to
inform the caseworkers about their role in the experiment. During the experiment we
visited all local offices almost weekly to answer questions of caseworkers and monitor the
implementation of the experiment. At the start of every three-month period we instructed
each caseworker individually about the new policy regime assigned to her. The caseworkers
then also received a new set of forms which they were required to fill in for each new welfare
recipient at the intake meeting. These forms were personalized for each caseworker and
had their current policy regime pre-printed on the form, in order to remind the caseworker
of their policy regime.
At one local office the manager was changed several times during the experiment.
As a result, the caseworkers at this office received mixed instructions with respect to
their participation in the experiment, which had its effect on their compliance with the
experiment. For example, the second (interim) manager explicitly instructed caseworkers
to ignore the experiment to boost exit to work for the period that she was manager. We
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exclude all welfare recipients from this welfare office from the empirical analysis.13
After the experiment we administered a survey among all participating caseworkers.
The goal of this survey was to learn about choices caseworkers make when supporting
benefits recipients in their job search. Furthermore, we wanted to have insight in the
beliefs of caseworkers about the effectiveness of the different welfare-to-work programs
and how they update these beliefs. This allows us to address caseworker learning.
4 Data and empirical strategy
4.1 Data sources
In the empirical analysis we employ data from several sources. First, we use administrative
date from the welfare agency of Amsterdam, which provide information on the start and
end date of collecting welfare benefits, exact records of all benefits payments, and an
identifier for the caseworker assigned to the benefits recipient. In addition, these data
include all contacts (meetings, phone calls and email contact) between the caseworker
and the benefits recipient and participation in the welfare-to-work programs. Finally, the
welfare agency registers individual characteristics such as gender, date of birth, highest
obtained education and household composition.
The second data source is employment and income data abstracted from social insur-
ance records. These records have weekly information for each individual on the amount of
earnings from employment and all types of benefits payments (including welfare benefits
in other municipalities and benefits from other schemes such as unemployment and dis-
ability insurance). The data on all participants in the experiment cover the period from
January 2008 until May 2014 and allow us to construct outcomes such as earnings from
work and total income after random assignment. We exploit the retrospective nature to
construct control variables describing the labor market history before entering welfare.
Income from self employment is missing because self-employed workers do not participate
in social insurance schemes.
13Applicants from this local office constitute 20 percent of the experimental sample.
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The third data source is the forms completed by caseworkers at the intake meeting.
The form asks the date of birth, gender, educational level, household composition, reason
of applying for welfare, a subjective measure for the financial situation, an estimate from
the caseworker on the duration of welfare benefits dependency and an indication which
welfare-to-work programs will be offered to the welfare recipient. This final question
was included to check whether the caseworker complied to the policy regime or used the
possibility to deviate in special cases. The forms were filled in for 73 percent of the
welfare recipients that participated in the experiment. Given that all crucial information
is available through the administrative records (for the full sample), we only use these
forms for complementary information.
Finally, we have information from the (ex-post) survey that was administered among
the participating caseworkers. The survey included questions on caseworker characteristics
and asked their opinion on the experiment. This survey was conducted after the results
of the evaluation were presented to the management of the welfare agency and at all
local offices. When filling in the survey the caseworkers were familiar with the estimated
effectiveness of each of the welfare-to-work programs. In the survey we asked for the
caseworker’s beliefs on effectiveness of the different programs and whether they changed
their beliefs after the experiment. The response rate to the survey is 81 percent (50 out
of 62 caseworkers that participated in the experiment), or excluding the local office that
did not comply to the experiment 75 percent (40 out of 53 caseworkers).
4.2 Descriptive statistics and balancing
During the experiment 2103 individuals, who started collecting welfare benefits in Amster-
dam satisfied the criteria for participation in our experiment (class IV and older than 27
years). A small number of individuals experienced multiple welfare spells within the exper-
imental period, so the sample contains 2061 unique individuals. This number is slightly
lower than the inflow of 2500 individuals which was expected prior to the experiment.
From our sample we exclude 424 applications (416 unique individuals), who applied at the
local office where compliance was low due to changing managers during the experiment
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics and balancing
Policy regime
Counseling Activation Matching Discretion Nothing All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 36% 38% 38% 36% 38% 37%
Partner 9% 13% 11% 10% 13% 11%
Children 10% 14% 13% 13% 10% 12%
Age (in yrs) 38.9 38.8 38.3 37.2** 38.9 38.4
Education (in yrs) 12.4 12.3 12.2 12.1 12.1 12.2
Education missing 1% 2% 2% 1% 1% 2%
Annual income 2 yrs 14.5 13.8 14.1 12.8 13.4 13.7
before (x1000 e)
N 353 333 328 394 271 1679
Note: Stars indicate that there is a significant difference with the policy regime nothing. These p-
values are weighted by the office of registration, as randomization took place within the welfare office.
∗∗∗ =significant at 1% level ∗∗ =at 5% level, ∗ =at 10% level.
period. Our final sample contains 1679 spells of collecting welfare benefits experienced by
1645 unique individuals.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics. The final column shows descriptives for the
entire sample, the other five columns the descriptives for each policy regime. The policy
regime with full discretion for the caseworker has the largest number of observations, while
nothing has the fewest observations. This is according to the design which followed the
request of the welfare agency to minimize the number of welfare recipients without any
guidance and ensured that all caseworkers are observe at least once in the policy regime
with full discretion. The compositions of the five treatment groups are well balanced. Out
of 28 t-tests, there is only one significant difference (at the five percent level) between the
groups.14
Less than 40 percent of the welfare recipients are women, about 90 percent are single
and slightly over 10 percent have children. The average age at starting collecting welfare
benefits is 38.4 years. This is relatively young given that we only consider individuals
older than 27. The explanation is that the entitlement period to unemployment insurance
14The p-values are weighted by office of registration, as randomization took place within each local
office.
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benefits depends on age, so older workers who lose their job have more time to find work
before becoming dependent on welfare benefits. On average, the individuals have slightly
more than 12 years of education. About 30 percent either have a bachelor or master degree
and 35 percent completed higher vocational education. Slightly less than 15 percent have
only followed primary education. In the two years before entering welfare, the average
annual income was about 13,700 euro, which is approximately the minimum wage.
4.3 Empirical strategy
We focus on estimating the effects of the different policy regimes on various labor market
outcomes. As reference we take the policy regime where nothing is done to the welfare
recipient. The variable Yiτtw denotes the labor market outcome of individual i observed t
time periods after applying for welfare benefits at welfare office w at calendar time τ . The
four different policy regimes are indicated with C (counseling), A (activation), M (direct
matching) and D (full discretion of the caseworker on which welfare-to-work program to
apply). Our regression model is specified as
Yiτtw = ατt + γwt + δ
c
tCiτw + δ
a
tAiτw + δ
m
t Miτw + δ
d
tDiτw +Xiβt + Uiτtw (1)
The vector Xi contains background characteristics including age, gender, partner status,
having children, cumulative income in the 24 months before welfare and level of education.
In addition, we control for whether the applicant received a job-search period at the time of
application for welfare benefits (for a discussion of this policy, see Bolhaar et al. (2018)).15
The parameters ατt are fixed effects for the quarter of entering welfare and account for
business cycle effects.
The parameters γwt are the fixed effects for the local welfare offices, which control for
potential differences between the local labor markets in the five city districts. Furthermore,
recall that within local offices the policy regimes are randomly assigned to caseworkers and
new welfare recipients are randomly allocated to caseworkers. The fixed effects for the
15Controlling for a job-search period does not affect our results.
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local offices are crucial to deal with the conditional random assignment (i.e. the rates at
which policy regimes are assigned differ between local offices). In the previous subsection
we showed that characteristics of welfare recipients in the different treatment groups are
balanced after weighting for the local office.
We estimate this model separately for different elapsed durations t since applying for
welfare benefits. The parameters of interest δ·t describe the effect of the different policy
regimes t weeks after entering welfare benefits. Using this empirical model, we obtain the
intention-to-treat effect (compared to no support of the caseworker). Below we discuss
the compliance to each policy regime, but compliance is not perfect for three reasons.
First, caseworkers were given the option to deviate from the approach described in the
policy regime. Second, in some cases welfare recipients did not satisfy the criteria for
participating in a welfare-to-work program (e.g. language and computer skills at job-
search activation). And third, some welfare recipients found work quickly, so before the
support of the caseworker could have started.
Since a small fraction of the applicants appear twice in the data we cluster standard
errors at the level of the individual welfare applicant.
5 Results
We present results in four steps. First, we provide evidence on the effectiveness of the
different policy regimes. Second, we investigate the choices that caseworkers make within
each policy regime, and assess whether caseworkers assign applicants to programs that are
most effective for them. Third, we investigate if caseworkers that specialize in a specific
program get better results when applying them. Finally, we investigate if caseworkers
learn by assessing if they changed their choices after being exposed to a different way of
working.
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Figure 3: Percentage of applicants receiving welfare benefits by policy regime
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Note: Results are weighted by local office as this was the level of randomization.
5.1 Effects of the policy regimes
Figure 3 shows for each policy regime the percentage of individuals that collect welfare
benefits since their moment of application.16 During the first 10 weeks after application,
there are no substantial differences between policy regimes in the likelihood to receive
benefits. After that exit in the direct matching regime is slightly higher. After about
20 weeks differences between policy regimes get more pronounced. First, outflow in the
policy regime with no support lags behind and next also the job-search activation regime
has a lower outflow than the other regimes. Almost at each moment outflow is highest in
the direct matching regime. One year after inflow the outflow from welfare is almost ten
percentage points higher in the direct matching regime than in the nothing regime.
16The moment of application may be earlier than the moment of eligibility for welfare benefits. For
example, the unemployment insurance administration advises individuals who are close to exhausting
unemployment insurance benefits to already apply for welfare benefits. Also, some applications are initially
incomplete and denied, but after a reapplication the individuals may still entitle to welfare. At the initial
application, an individual is matched to a caseworker, which determines the policy regime.
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Figure 4: Effect of policy regimes on the probability to receive welfare benefits (0/1)
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Note: This figure is based on 52 separate regressions, following equation (1). Included controls are calendar
time fixed effects, local office fixed effects and applicant characteristics. The applicant characteristics are
age at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in 24 months before registration
and dummies for five education categories. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the applicant.
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To explore whether the observed differences in Figure 3 are statistically significant,
we estimate the regression model in equation (1) where benefits receipt is the outcome.
The model is estimated separately for each week since the moment of application and the
effects of the policy regimes (compared to the policy regime where no support is given) are
shown in Figure 4 together with the 90 percent confidence interval. Outflow in the policy
regime with job-search activation is the same as in the policy regime without support.
There might be lock-in effects associated to the job-search activation. The waiting list
for the training is around three months and some individuals may reduce their job-search
effort while waiting for the start of the training. We return to other explanations below.
The policy regime with counseling has a higher outflow after 30 weeks, but differences are
not significant. Differences are significant for direct matching and for full discretion of
the caseworker. Direct matching and full discretion show very similar patterns of outflow,
which implies that caseworkers with full discretion cannot target support such that they
obtain a higher outflow than in a more restricted policy regime. We return to this issue
below.
Finding work is the most frequent reason for outflow from welfare benefits, but it is
not the only reason. Furthermore, individuals who leave welfare because they find work,
may also lose their job again. Therefore, in Figure 5 we show effects on having work (with
positive earnings) for each week after application to welfare benefits. The figures largely
show the reversed pattern as in Figure 4. The main exception is that about 40 weeks
after application individuals in the job-search activation regime have a significant lower
probability to have a job with positive earnings than in the policy regime with no support.
Welfare-to-work programs may not only affect the rate at which work is found but
can also affect the quality of the job. Job quality is often proxied by earnings. Figure 6
reports the effects of the policy regimes on the earnings in each week after application.
Individuals who do not have a job in a particular week, have zero earnings. There are also
individuals with very flexible contracts who have some weeks very low earnings. Since the
earnings measure is noisier than, for example, and indicator for work, confidence intervals
are wider. The effects of direct matching and full discretion are no longer significant, which
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Figure 5: Effect of policy regimes on the probability to have a job (0/1)
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Note: This figure is based on 52 separate regressions, following equation (1). Included controls are calendar
time fixed effects, local office fixed effects and applicant characteristics. The applicant characteristics are
age at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in 24 months before registration
and dummies for five education categories. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the applicant.
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implies that many people find low paying jobs. This is in agreement with the observation
that often trial periods and wage subsidies are necessary to convince employers to hire
welfare recipients. Moreover, our experiment was done during a recession with relative
high unemployment for the Netherlands.
Most striking is the negative effect of the job-search activation regime on earnings,
which already becomes negative after about 13 weeks. The job-search activation program
was originally designed for workers in lower classes (larger distance to the labor market).
The focus is largely on finding employment via temp work agencies. Because there were
not enough welfare recipients in the lower classes satisfying the participation criteria, the
job-search activation was also made available for welfare recipients in class IV. Our results
suggest that jobs in temp work sector are not the best match for welfare recipients in class
IV.
Figure 6: Effect of policy regimes on earnings
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Note: This figure is based on 52 separate regressions, following equation (1). Included controls are calendar
time fixed effects, local office fixed effects and applicant characteristics. The applicant characteristics are
age at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in 24 months before registration
and dummies for five education categories. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the applicant.
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Finally, Figure 7 shows the effects on total income, which is the sum of welfare ben-
efits, earnings and income from other types of benefits. This figure confirms the earlier
finding. The higher job finding in the regimes with direct matching and full discretion
of caseworkers do not translate in higher income for the welfare recipient. The earnings
in most jobs do not exceed the benefits level. Job-search activation significantly reduces
total income. The most likely explanation is that individuals who exit the welfare benefits
system get flexible contract in the temp work sector which often provide too few hours of
work in a week to earn more than the welfare benefits level. Counseling has zero effects
on total income.
Figure 7: Effect of policy regimes on total income
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Note: This figure is based on 52 separate regressions, following equation (1). Included controls are calendar
time fixed effects, local office fixed effects and applicant characteristics. The applicant characteristics are
age at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative income in 24 months before registration
and dummies for five education categories. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the applicant.
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Table 3: Actual program participation in the different policy regimes
Policy regime
Nothing Counseling Activation Matching Discretion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No support 84% 23% 21% 29% 29%
Welfare-to-work program:
Counseling 10% 70% 47% 49% 55%
Job-search activation 3% 6% 36% 4% 8%
Direct matching 10% 30% 27% 50% 36%
Job-hunter 2% 10% 8% 8% 10%
Other 4% 10% 19% 18% 14%
Contacts with caseworker 0.73 1.07 1.02 1.16 0.96
(monthly)
N 271 353 333 328 394
5.2 Compliance by caseworkers
For the interpretation of the results in the previous subsection it is important to know
which welfare-to-work programs were applied in the different policy regimes. This is shown
in Table 3. The numbers in each column do not add up to one, as an individual can partic-
ipate in multiple programs. In addition to the three welfare-to-work programs (counseling,
direct matching and job-search activation) considered in the experiment, we also distin-
guish ‘job-hunter’ and ‘other’. The job-hunter is a program that was first introduced when
our experiment was already running.17 We can, therefore, not include it in the description
of the policy regimes. The same holds for some small and very specific welfare-to-work
programs that are included in the category ‘other’.
The first thing to note in Table 3 is that compliance to the policy regime nothing is
high. About 84 percent of the welfare recipients in this policy regime did not receive any
support from the caseworker. This percentage is much higher than in the other policy
17A job-hunter is a person (not the caseworker) that has to acquire vacancies and find suitable welfare
recipients to fill these vacancies. As such, it is somewhat similar to the instrument direct matching,
the difference being that the initiative for the match comes from the job-hunter instead of from the
caseworker/welfare recipient.
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regimes, where no support is often associated to individuals who exit welfare quickly.18
Also the newly introduced programs (job-hunter and other) were less frequently provided to
welfare recipients in the policy regime without guidance. This confirms that by comparing
outcomes in the other policy regime to the policy regime nothing we learn about the added
value of the various welfare-to-work programs and the practice of the welfare agency.
Looking at the other policy regimes, we see that the random assignment of the policy
regimes changed the support given by the caseworker. For example, the policy regime with
the job-search activation increased participating in this program with about 30 percentage
points. In case of counseling and direct matching the increase is 20 percentage points.
Interesting to note is how caseworkers allocate welfare-to-work programs in case they have
full discretion. In that case about 30 percent of the welfare recipients do not receive any
support, 55 percent receive counseling, less than 10 percent participate in the job-search
activation program and direct matching is applied to 36 percent. If we also take the
job-hunter and other programs into account, this implies that welfare recipients that do
receive support, on average, participate in two welfare-to-work programs.
An alternative way to characterize the policy regimes is to look at the number of
contacts that welfare recipients have with their caseworker. The bottom row of Table 3
shows the average number of times that the caseworker contacts the welfare recipient per
month under the different policy regimes. Under no guidance, the caseworkers clearly had
fewer contact with the applicant than under the other policy regimes. The number of
meetings under no guidance is not zero because the caseworkers occasionally have to meet
their clients in order to discuss the technical aspects of their benefits payments. However,
we asked the caseworkers in this policy regime not to be proactive towards the benefits
recipient with respect to job coaching.
Combining the actual policies that are applied with the estimated effects of the different
policy regimes on welfare receipt and other labor market outcomes, there are a few things
18Figure A1 in the Appendix shows the likelihood to receive no guidance against the months until
exiting welfare. For all policy regimes excluding no guidance, more than 60 percent of the individuals that
exit welfare within two months after registration receive no guidance. This reduces to around ten percent
conditional on exit after ten months. Only for the policy regime nothing the percentage of individuals
without support is consistently around 80 percent.
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that we can conclude. First, the policy regimes in which caseworkers have unrestricted
access to direct matching (direct matching and full discretion) perform significantly better
than no support by caseworkers with both higher exit from welfare and higher job finding.
Second, the policy regime counseling does not lead to a higher outflow out of welfare
benefits or higher earnings, compared to no support. This suggests that outflow from
welfare does not increase if a caseworker can only provide counseling without directly
providing vacancies. Third, the encouragement to participate in the job-search activation
program, makes labor market outcomes significantly worse than any of the other policy
regimes, including giving no guidance. From this we can conclude that the job-search
activation program is ill suited for the welfare recipients in our experiment, which have
relatively favorable labor market prospects among welfare recipients. We explain the latter
from the relatively long waiting period and the strong focus on the temp work sector
In the policy regime where the caseworker has full discretion in choosing the most
appropriate welfare-to-work program, the caseworker has the possibility to target programs
to welfare recipients. If caseworkers can target programs optimally, then the policy regime
with full discretion should outperform all other programs. This does not seem the case, in
particular since the policy regime with direct matching seems to perform as least as good.
Although it should be noted that program choice in the policy regime with full discretion
has quite some similarities with direct matching. Maybe with the exception that the job-
search activation program is used twice as frequent and direct matching somewhat less
frequent.
5.3 Caseworker specialization
The fifth column in Table 3 shows which welfare-to-work programs caseworkers apply
when they have full discretion. As expected, each program is used less than in case of
the policy regimes with encouragement for the program, but each program is used much
more than in the policy regime without any support. In this subsection, we study if all
caseworkers use mixtures of programs or if caseworkers focus on a single welfare-to-work
program (which can differ between caseworkers).
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Figure 8: Fraction of welfare recipients that participates in each welfare-to-work program
by caseworker in full discretion regime
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Figure 8 shows for each casework the fraction of welfare recipients that participate in a
particular program in the policy regime of full discretion. There is substantial dispersion
between caseworkers in how often they assign welfare recipients to the different welfare-
to-work programs. For example, some caseworkers almost never use direct matching while
others use it for the majority of their welfare recipients. Overall rates of use for the job-
search activation are low and many caseworkers never assign welfare recipients to this
training, but a few caseworkers very often assign welfare recipients to this program.
We use the information from Figure 8 to define specialization by caseworkers. In par-
ticular, we distinguish between caseworkers who use a welfare-to-work program more or
less frequent than the mean of all caseworkers. Next, we interact the assigned policy
regime with an indicator for the caseworker using the associated welfare-to-work program
more often than the mean caseworker. This provides insight in whether caseworkers that
specialize in a particular welfare-to-work program obtain better outcome with this pro-
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Table 4: Effect of the different policy regimes on labor market outcomes, split by case-
worker specialization
Outcome Treatment applied
Weeks on welfare Weeks with work Discretion Assigned
policy regime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Counseling:
Low use -0.94 (1.70) 0.08 (1.77) 0.40 0.63
High use -1.01 (1.94) 0.36 (2.19) 0.76 0.81
Activation:
Low use -0.17 (1.61) -1.59 (1.69) 0.02 0.36
High use -0.61 (2.74) -4.43 (2.97) 0.36 0.38
Matching:
Low use -2.80 (1.75) 4.16* (1.87) 0.18 0.40
High use -1.71 (2.01) -0.67 (2.11) 0.50 0.64
Note: The two rows under the name of each policy regime represent each one regression including the in-
teraction of the relevant policy regime with the low or high use indicator. Included controls are indicators
for the other policy regimes, calendar time fixed effects, local office fixed effects and applicant character-
istics. The applicant characteristics are age at registration, gender, household composition, cumulative
income in 24 months before registration and dummies for five education categories. Standard errors are
clustered at the level of the applicant. ∗∗∗ =significant at 1% level ∗∗ =at 5% level, ∗ =at 10% level.
gram. Table 4 presents the estimated effect of the different policy regimes on cumulative
weeks on welfare and weeks with work (in the year after application). The rows labeled
with ‘low use’ provide the effects for caseworkers that have a low use of the encouraged
program under full discretion, while the rows with ‘high use’ present the estimated effects
for caseworkers with an above average use of the encouraged program. Columns (3) and
(4) show the fraction of clients that received a certain treatment under discretion and
when the caseworker was assigned to that policy regime. Low-use caseworkers increase
their use of a specific treatment when assigned to that policy regime while high-use case-
workers hardly change behavior when assigned their favorite treatment (as their use of
that treatment is already high).
If caseworkers that specialize in a program have better results when providing this pro-
gram, we expect that the effects are more substantial for high use caseworkers. For direct
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matching, we observe the opposite: the effects are larger for caseworkers who usually do
not use direct matching often. For the outcome weeks with work the difference between
low and high use is also significant. For activation we see a similar pattern, the large nega-
tive effect on weeks with work is more pronounced for caseworkers that also use activation
when they have full discretion. Finally, for counseling the differences are very small and
not significant. Summarizing these results, we do not find strong evidence supporting the
idea that caseworkers who specialize in a particular welfare-to-work program obtain larger
effects when applying this program.
5.4 Caseworker learning
Above we showed that caseworkers often have a very different approach when supporting
welfare recipients. In the usual policy regime they have substantial discretion and they
use this to focus on different welfare-to-work programs. We showed that there is hetero-
geneity in the effectiveness of the different welfare-to-work programs. In particular, direct
matching is most effective in increasing job finding, while job-search activation mainly has
adverse effects for the welfare recipients in our experiment population. Our experiment
forced caseworkers to change their usual approach and also consider other welfare-to-work
programs when supporting welfare recipients. Furthermore, the experiment provides in-
sight in the effectiveness of the different programs, which was not systematically collected
before. In this subsection we study if caseworkers respond to this by changing their ap-
proach for supporting welfare recipients.
After the experiment and also after we had presented results to the management and
at the local offices, we conducted a survey among caseworkers.19 In the survey we asked
caseworkers to answer for each of the welfare-to-work programs ‘Compared to before the
experiment, have you changed your belief about to the usefulness of the program’. Case-
workers answered these questions on a scale from 0-100 where we indicated less useful
(<50) no change (50) and more useful (>50). The results which are summarized in Table
19Caseworkers were also present in the meetings in which we presented our empirical findings about the
effectiveness of the different welfare-to-work programs.
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Table 5: Perceived effectiveness of different instruments compared to beliefs prior to the
experiment
Less useful No change More useful
(1) (2) (3)
Counseling 19% 33% 47%
Job-search activation 34% 37% 29%
Direct matching 43% 11% 46%
N 36
5 do not concur with our empirical findings. In particular, 43 percent of the caseworkers
believe that direct matching is less useful, while we find it to be the most effective in-
strument. Similarly, 47 percent of the caseworkers report that counseling is more useful
than they thought before the experiment, even though we find that counseling does not
outperform providing no support. Finally, 29 percent answer that the job-search activa-
tion program is more useful, a program that we find to be not only non-effective, but also
harmful to both outflow from welfare and income of the welfare recipient.
Next, we asked caseworkers in the survey if they actually change their usual approach of
supporting welfare recipients in their job search.20 In particular, we asked them about the
frequency or their use of each welfare-to-work program in relation to before the experiment.
The answers are again on a scale from 0-100, which we categorized as less use (<50), no
change (50) in use and more use (>50). The results are presented in Table 6. The
tendency is to intensify the use of welfare-to-work programs, and in particular counseling.
The results also show that more caseworkers want to use job-search activation more often
than less frequently, and direct matching is mentioned most often as program that should
be used less frequently.
When asked whether the caseworkers found the experiment useful only five out of 50
answered negatively. The responses to the survey indicate that a majority of the case-
20Due to data limitations we do not observe the welfare-to-work policies that caseworkers applied after
the experimental period.
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Table 6: Use of different instruments compared to before the experiment
use less no change use more
(1) (2) (3)
Counseling 11% 33% 56%
Job-search activation 23% 46% 31%
Direct matching 31% 34% 34%
N 36
workers provide support differently after the experiment. However, the caseworkers do
not use empirical evidence to update their beliefs about the welfare-to-work programs.
Their answers about the effectiveness of programs and their intended use are not aligned
with our empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the different programs. A likely expla-
nation is that due to the experiment caseworkers learn about other characteristics of the
welfare-to-work programs which they value more than effectiveness. For example, some
caseworkers indicated that they do not like direct matching because it provides free labor
to employers, who have only limited commitment.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we study the role of the caseworker in the assignment and take-up of active
labor market programs. We conduct a field experiment where five different policy regimes
are randomly assigned to caseworkers and welfare recipients are randomly assigned to
caseworkers. We find that direct matching to vacancies is effective in terms of higher
exit from welfare and increased job finding. Participation in the job-search activation
program makes labor market outcomes significantly worse than any of the other policy
regimes, including giving no guidance. Our empirical results do no show evidence in favor
of efficient targeting of welfare-to-work programs by caseworkers. Moreover, we find that
some caseworkers continue specializing in job-search activation, even after being informed
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that it has adverse consequences on the labor market prospects of benefits recipients.
Our findings imply that even when there is credible knowledge about the effectiveness
of certain active labor market programs, the roll-out of such a program is not obvious.
Caseworkers have substantial discretion, and do not easily change behavior, also not when
provided with the necessary information. This finding confirms earlier results of Behncke
et al. (2009) and Schmieder and Trenkle (2016). As a response, benefits agencies can
formulate policy regimes to reduce discretion, but even with such regimes the heterogene-
ity of benefit recipients requires some discretion for caseworkers. Overall, it means that
learning which active labor market programs are effective is not enough to improve the
use of welfare-to-work programs.
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A Appendix
Table A1: Benefit levels (net, in e per month)
Housing costs
Full Shared None
Single without children 935.80 802.12 668.43
Single with children 1203.19 1069.50 935.81
Couple without children 1336.87 1203.19 1069.50
Couple with children 1336.87 1203.19 1069.50
Note: Benefit levels in period July 1 to December 31 in 2012, including holiday allowance. Benefit levels
outside this time frame differ only marginally. Shared housing costs apply if the costs are shared with an
individual that is not the partner or the child.
Table A2: Description of the seven fictional clients
Person 1 A married man of 50 years old. He has limited command of Dutch, and
only finished primary school.
Person 2 A woman of 38 years old. She is divorced and has two children aged
four and seven. Her ex-partner refuses to pay the alimony, so she hardly
manages to make ends meet. She has little work experience.
Person 3 A single man of 33 years old. The past few years he only had tempo-
rary jobs. He only followed preparatory vocational education, but never
finished his vocational degree.
Person 4 A highly educated woman of 51 years old. She has a lot of work experi-
ence and has never relied on welfare benefits before. She has made a lot
of job applications, but is continously rejected.
Person 5 A man of 45 years old. He applies for welfare benefits because his shop
went bankrupt. He wants to have a regular job and has already dereg-
istered as self-employed at the chamber of commerce (Kamer van Koo-
phandel).
Person 6 A single woman of 32 years old. She has a lot of debts, rent, phone
bills, health insurance, mail order companies etc. At the first meeting
she arrives late.
Person 7 A single man of 29 years old. He graduated last year and traveled after-
wards. Now he is looking for his dream job.
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Figure A1: No instrument applied to client, by duration of the benefits spell
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